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Abstract
As mentioned earlier, the Bergmann model predicts that female and male lawyers will be segregated into
different areas of practice. If this is the case, what are the forces behind this sector-specific segregation? On the
supply side, Becker relies on the Neoclassical theories of utility maximization and human capital theory. These
theories suggest that an increase in the store of human capital through training and education will be
undertaken by the employee or provided by the employer if the benefits exceed the cost.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol3/iss1/16
Barb Kube '94 graduated from IWU last 
spring with a degree in economics and now 
attends law school at the University of 
Illinois. The following paper is from Barb's 
Research Honors class. While at IWU, 
Barb was president of the Economics 
Society and the Intro"to Economics tutor. 
Women in Law 
by Barb Kube 
L INTRODUCTION 
Harvard Law School first admitted women 
in 1950. Harvard was not alone in its long­
standing opposition to an open admissions 
policy. Notre Dame's law school waited until 
1969 to begin enrolling women, and the law 
schQo.l at Washington and Lee University did 
not implement a similar policy until 1972 
(Epstein 1981, p. 50). Today females 
account for 40-50% of law school enrollment 
and around 22% of our nation's lawyers 
(ROUNDTABLE 2,1993, p. 19). 
Despite evidence that no overt wage 
discrimination exists between the sexes, 54% 
offemale lawyers (and 290A. ofmale lawyers) 
feel that men have a greater chance of 
becoming involved with firm management 
(ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 21). Furthermore, 
when "Gilda" (a female attorney who 
responded on condition of anonymity) was 
asked "Do you know what it takes to make 
partner in your finn?", a male colleague 
replied, "A sex change". "Gilda" countered, 
"Good point"(ROUNDTABLE 1, 1993, p. 
20). Still another female lawyer reports that 
the firm she is working for Itactually 
discourages women from practicing law once 
they have started a family"(ROUNDTABLE 1, 
49 
19). Is it possible that pecuniary 
discrimination, which is illegal, is being 
supplemented by other forms of discrimination 
and pressures against female lawyers? If so, 
how is it being manifested? 
This study will attempt to reconcile the 
views presented by academic theory with those 
expounded by members ofthe legal profession. 
Following reviews of.discrimination theory and 
previous research, a section will be devoted to 
explaining the empirical model that is to be 
utilized in this paper. Results and policy 
implications will also be presented. 
II. AN OVERCROWDING MODEL OF 
GENDER DISCRIMINAnON IN LAW: _. 
Labor market discrimination occurs 
whenever men and women of equal 
productivity and aspirations are treated 
differently in hiring, retention, training, and 
promotion practices (Hoffinan, p. 2). 
Economists generally agree on these 
principles, but they do not always agree on 
theoretical explanations of this phenomena. 
Perhaps this is because individual labor 
markets are unique. Also, it may be that the 
explanations oflabor market discrimination are 
as diverse as the disciplines that study it. Six 
general explanations include: 
1. neoclassical, based on models of 
statistical discrimination and investments in 
human capital; 
2. social psychological, emphasizing 
socialization and internalized norms; 
3. institutional, emphasizing the intended 
and unintended consequences and inertia of 
organizational arrangements; 
4. cultural, emphasizing taken-for-granted 
notions of men's work and women's work, 
often shared by both men and women; 
5. political, stressing the different interests 
ofmale employers and employees with respect 
to maintaining the status quo; and 
6. patriarchal, emphasizing the common 
interests of male workers and employers in 
maintain a sex-based division oflabor (Bielby, 
p. 107). One economic theory that can 
potentially capture moSt ofthese effects is Dr. 
Barbara Bergmann's model of labor market 
overcrowding, and Bergmann's model serves 
as the central framework for this study. 
Rather than looking at a-labor market as the 
sum of its parts, Bergmann argues that 
stereotypes and society's perceptions about 
what is "nonnal" actually divide labor markets 
into two separate labor markets--one for males 
and the other for females--in which the 
individuals are perfect substitutes. Bergmann's 
theory is summarized in Figure 1 on the 
following page (Blau/Ferber 1992, p.214). 
Suppose the undiscriminating market of 
(f+m), which pays wage WO, experiences 
discrimination and divides into a market for 
those discriminated against (f) and one for the 
preferred co-workers (m). Demand is no 
longer in the form ofDEMAND(f+m), but is 
rather DEMANDf and DEMANDm. Jobs in 
the separate market (m) are filled by a 
restricted supply of labor (m) and wages for 
(m) inc(ease. Also, members of (f) must 
"crowd" into a restricted number ofpositions 
if they want to remain in the market. As 
Figure 1 (on -the next page) illustrates, pay 
differentials will develop whenever, relative to 
their respective supplies, -DEMANDm is 
greater than DEMANDf. More females are 
"crowded" into a market that faces less 
demand. Lower wages for females result from 
each female attorney being less productive 
because she has less capital with which to 
work. As previously mentioned, those who 
remain in market (m) receive higher wages; 
members of(m) are more productive because 
each has more capital to work with. Thus, as 
seen in Figure 1 (see next page), both groups 
are paid according to their productivity. It is 
important to remember that group (f) is forced 
to be less produ~ive--they are forced into a 
crowded market (Blau/Ferber, pp. 212-15). 
In terms of the labor market for lawyers, 
the .overcrowding model predicts that 1) 
female lawyers (f) will be paid less than their 
male counterparts (m), and that 2) a barrier 
exists between labor markets (f) and (m) 
which segregates female and male lawyers into 
different areas of practice. Whereas 
Bergmann's model directly suggests a testable 
hypothesis regarding male and female roles 
within the legal profession (crowding), it does 
not offer as obyious of an,explanation for the 
causes of crowding. Other theories may 
provide greater insight into the causes of any 
apparent crowding. 
A.	 BECKER'S ECONOMICS OF 
DISCRIMINAnON 
On the demand side, female participation in 
the legal labor market (f) is influenced by 
employers, consumers, and fellow employees. 
What causes these three groups to treat female 
lawyers as fundamentally different from their 
male counterparts?- One of the pioneering 
theories of discrimination, developed by Dr. 
Gary S. Becker, provides further insight into 
this issue. In his The Economics of 
Discrimination (1957, 1971), Becker 
theorizes that employers, employees, and 
consumers have different "tastes" for 
discrimination which cause them to act "as ire 
they are "willing to pay something either 
directly or in the form ofa reduced income to 
be associated with some persons instead of 
others"; the dollar value that each individual is 
willing to "pay" to put up with working with 
certain individuals is called a discrimination 
coefficient (DC). 
Employers and consumers perceive net 
wages and net prices as relatively higher 
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Figure 1: A Model ofLaborMarket Overcrowding 
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because they are "paying" for undesirable . compete by lowering DCs until the DC for 
associations with the discriminated-against 
person; their DC is positive. Similarly, 
discriminating employees perceive lower net 
wages because of the "disutility" associated 
with working with the discriminated-against 
co-worker, and therefore have a negative DC. 
Non-discriminators have a DC ofzero. 
In terms of this study, if wf is the wage 
received by female lawyers (the discriminated­
against factor) and wm is the wage of male 
lawyers, assuming that productivity is equal, 
wf 'should equal wm. However, the full cost 
that a discriminating employer perceives when 
employing a female lawyer is (wf+ DCemp). 
Thus, if the male atto~ey receives wm, the 
discriminated against female receives (wm ­
DCemp) (Becker 1971, pp. 14-15). At least 
in the short-run, the differences in DCs will 
result in wage differentials and job segregation 
across firms. 
In his The Economics of 
Discrimination, Gary Becker 
theorizes that employers, 
employees and consumers 
have different "tastes" for 
discrimination. 
Using the Neoclassical theories ofmarginal 
productivjty and utility maximization, as well 
as the assumption of competition, Becker 
contends that firms with lower DCs should 
have lower production costs. Lower 
production costs give firms with lower DCs a 
comparative advantage. If the comparative 
advantage persists, ceteris paribus, it will 
drive finns with higher DCs out ofthe market 
and eliminate discrimination--firms will 
surviving firms is zero. 
However, the persistence of discrimination 
depends on the market structure. As the 
market becomes less competitive, employers 
can engage in higher degrees ofdiscrimination 
without fearing cut-throat wage competition 
(Blau/Ferber, pp. 203-4). 
Within the .legal profession, competition 
may be inhibited by several factors. Consumer 
and employee discrimination are two such 
factors. Even ifan employer has no taste for 
discrimination, he/she may, in the name of 
profit-maximizing, be forced to discriminate 
when other employees or customers have 
discriminatory tastes (BlaulFerber). One 
example might involve firms specializing in -: .-. 
labor law; union officials have been known to 
be reluctant and even opposed to working with 
female attorneys (ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 28). 
Ifunions refuse to be represented by a female, 
the productivity of the female lawyer is 
diminished. Rather than hiring a female 
attorney, the firm will opt for hiring a male; 
supply oflabor lawyers is restricted, and their 
wages increase. Becker's assumption of 
perfect competition is not maintained. 
As mentioned earlier, the Bergmann model 
predicts that female and male lawyers will be 
segregated into different areas ofpractice. If 
this is the case, what are the forces behind this 
sector-specific segregation? On the supply­
side, Becker relies on the Neoclassical theories 
of utility maximization and human capital 
theory. These theories suggest that an 
increase in the store ofhuman capital through 
training and education will be undertaken by 
. the employee or provided by the employer if 
the benefits exceed the cost. 
There are two types of training: general 
training and firm-specific training. General 
training will increase an individual's 
productivity to the same extent no matter 
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where he/she works. With firm-specific 
training, as its' name implies, skills cannot be 
transferred to another firm. Who pays for the 
training will likely depend on who receives the 
benefits. In most cases, the individual pays for • 
general training. Since it is mutually 
beneficial, the cost offirm-specific training is 
often shared by both the employer and 
employee. Thus, because the employer bears 
part of the cost, he/she is concerned with the 
expected employment life of the employee-­
how long will the firm benefit from its 
investment in the training (BlaulFerber, pp. 
164-67)? Between two equally qualified 
candidates, a profit-maximizing finn would 
hire or promote the employee with the longest 
expected employment life. Often this decision 
is based on group averages or stereotypes. 
(Decisions based on such averages will be 
discussed in the next section.) 
With respect to the legal profession, it is 
assumed that each individual starts out with 
similar.general training--a law school degree. 
Although there may be differences with 
respect to experience--Iaw journal, internship, 
and clerkship activities-when two individuals 
enter practice at the same level and at the same 
time, it is assumed that they are equally 
productive, ceteris paribus. When the job is 
secured, human capital (productivity) is 
enhanced by finn-specific training such as 
mentor-protege relationships, "power" lunches 
and the like. Becker postulates that profit­
maximizers will invest in the employee with 
the longest expected employment life. 
Furthermore, individuals allocate both time 
and effort between market and non-market 
activities; and since women allocate more 
effort to home activities, they have less effort 
(relative to men) to allocate to work. Thus, 
women are less productive and should be paid 
accordingly (cited in Bielby). Following this 
line of reasoning, some argue that women 
cannot "hack it" in the more "demanding" 
areas of law, such as litigation. 
Bielby (1991) offers several alternative 
explanations for women being just as 
productive as men in the workplace even 
though they allocate more time to non-market, 
home activities: 1) some men choose not to 
draw on reserve stockpiles of effort, 2) 
physiological evidence supports the notion that 
humans have renewable energy sources--being 
active is stimulating, 3) as in Becker's theory, 
'sex roles are taken for granted, and 4) the 
allocation of work effort may not be a 
deliberate or conscious choice. 
Blau and Ferber also cast a shadow of 
doubt on Becker's Neoclassical theory. They 
point out that mentor-protege relationships are 
usually initiated by the - experienced... 
professional; if a field's senior members are 
mostly male, as is the case with law, a large 
majority of mentors will be male. Male 
mentors tend to choose male proteges. While 
no economic theory specifically explains why 
this happens, it has been suggested that male 
mentors feel uncomfortable and "unable to 
relate" to female proteges. Also, wives and 
colleagues may pressure them not to have 
female proteges (BlaulFerber). Similar to the 
influence of consumers' tastes for 
discrimination, a non-discriminating mentor 
may be forced to act discriminatingly. Thus, 
males are favored as proteges and gain a 
human capital advantage. Specifically Michael ­
J. Howlett Jr., a partner in a Chicago law firm, 
a former associate judge and special deputy . 
outside counsel for the United States House of 
Representatives Ethics Committee (1988-89), 
points out that "Not enough of what we do 
generally in the practice of law is focused on 
how to mentor women associates. ...That is 
where I see a continuing glass ceiling or 
barrier (ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 25)". 
Research by Baron, et at suggests that 
when decision makers (employers) change 
more frequently and/or are younger, the 
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the labor queue (ranking) is greater. Such 
industries are expected to integrate more 
rapidly (cited in Reskin). Law is not one such 
industry. In fact, some criticize it for being 
patriarchal (Epstein 1981, p. 111). This also 
supports the preceding BlaulFerber argument. 
B. STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION 
On the other hand, it is possible that 
discrimination is not just the result of 
discriminatory "tastes" or human capital 
choice. Instead it may be the result of a" 
market failure, namely imperfect inforination. 
The model ofstatistical discrimination assumes 
that employers and/or consumers face 
imperfect infomiation and uncertainty 
regarding individuals' potential productivity. 
AS they make hiring or promotional decisions, 
employers project their "average" beliefs about 
a.particular group onto an individual applicant 
who belongs to that particular group. As a 
result, individuals are discriminated against 
because they (the applicants) are believed to 
share some undesirable stereotypic 
characteristic. While it may seem 
contradictory, if on average an employer's 
stereotypic views are proven correct, the 
resulting decisions are not discriminatory 
under a strict definition of discrilnination 
(BlaulFerber, pp. 208-10). The actual result 
remains the same--some qualified applicants 
are erroneously excluded from employment. 
Overcrowding theory would predict that 
the imperfect information decreases demand 
for female lawyers. Employers may believe 
that females do not have as high of an 
expected employment life as do their male 
counterparts and decide not to grant females 
the same opportunities of firm-specific 
training, job assignments or promotion that 
they offer to males. It: on average, these 
beliefs become reality the practice is not 
discriminatory. However, research by Viscusi, 
Blau and Kahn revealed that this does not 
seem to be the case--men and women have 
equal turnover rates, ceteris paribus (Olson 
and Becker 1983, p. 627). Therefore, 
segregating male and female lawyers by area of 
practice or job assignment fits the strict 
definition ofdiscrimination ifemployers make 
stereotypes based on erroneous information; it 
is a case of "irrational expectations". 
· One other thing to consider when dealing 
with statistical discrimination is how it affects 
the employment decisions of the stereotyped 
group. Statistical discrimination may have 
feedback effects. These effects include actions ' 
and/or reactions of discriminated-against 
individuals that are influenced by the 
knowledge that they are indeed discriminated 
against; the result is a self-fulfilling prophesy 
(BlaulFerber, pp. 208-10). For example, a 
female entering the legal profession may want 
to specialize in litigation. However, during an 
internship she leams that women .have few 
opportunities for advancement in litigation 
firms. In order to avoid being trapped in a 
dead-end job, the female decides to specialize 
in public interest law. On the surface this 
decision reinforces the stereotypes that women 
are not tough enough to make it in litigation 
and that they are "soft-hearted". But, this 
surface analysis reverses the causation-which 
came first, the chicken or the egg? 
IlL PREVIOUS RESEARCH: 
Until now most of the literature and 
research has focused explicitly on the theory of 
wage differentials. A study by Craig A. Olson 
and Brian E. Becker took a different approach 
and examined the effect of gender on 
promotion and the returns to promotion 
(1983). Olson and Becker predicted the 
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probability of promotion for men and women 
across all occupations during the years of 
1973-77, using data from the Quality of 
Employment PaneL 1973-77. Out of an 
original sample of 1455 individuals who were 
over the age of 16 and working more than 20 
hours per week, they used 408 individuals. 
The restricted sample excluded individuals 
whose data was incomplete as well as those 
who were either self-employed or had left their 
previous employer in 1973 (neither group had 
opportunities for promotion within the same 
firm for the years between 1973-1977). 
After explanations ofpromotions, wages 
and sample attrition, Olson and Becker 
constructed a three-equation model. The 
promotion equation captured both observable 
and unobservable components of expected 
performance. After controlling for 
occupation, education, tenure, labor force 
experience, union status, firm size, attrition, 
marital status, and region ofemployment, men 
and women do have significant differences in 
promotion. A gender variable revealed that 
being female ·decreased the likelihood of 
promotion; and even when they are promoted, 
women receive promotions ofless significance. 
These different and unequal promotional paths 
result in job segregation. 
After examining the impact that the 
promotion process had on wage differentials, 
they revealed that: 
[O]ur results indicate that women 
(men) would have received substantially 
more (fewer) promotions had they 
been held to the same standards as men 
(women). Although the female-male 
wage gap narrowed by about 6 percent 
between 1973 and 1977, it would have 
narrowed even further--by 8.6 to 9.2 
percent--ifmen and women had been 
promoted on the basis of the same 
criteria (p. 641). 
Concluding that men and women face 
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fundamentally different promotion processes, 
Olson and Becker stated that: 
[U]nequal access to opportunities, 
rather than unequal returns, constitutes 
the principal source ofmale-female 
differences in employment outcomes 
(p.641). 
These findings support Bergmann's 
overcrowding hypothesis. 
The theoretical implication of Bergmann 
also seems to be supported by a recent study 
that was conducted by Dr. David N. Laband 
and Dr. Bernard F. Lentz. In their study ofthe 
legal profession, they used a LOGIT 
regression to test the probability of an attorney 
achieving partnership. Probability of 
partnership was a positive and significant ­
function of experience and law school 
performance (p. 232). Using a dummy 
variable for gender, they received a 
significantly negative coefficient for female. 
However, controlling for family status 
decreased the significance and the value ofthe 
.variable. Finding that an individual's role in 
the family is more important than gender in 
predicting partnership, they concluded that 
there was no sex discrimination. However, 
another possibility is· that feedback effects are 
responsible for determining family status as 
well as type of practice. Laband and Lentz 
also examined wage differentials and 
promotion possibilities for female and male 
lawyers. No significant differences appeared. 
Furthermore, they used job-description 
variables as a means of testing for covert 
discrimination. Subjective ratings ofpotential 
for advancement, work atmosphere, level of 
responsibility, and office politics served as 
proxies for covert discrimination. Using OLS 
regression analysis, Laband and Lentz found 
that negative or low job description ratings 
were more significant for females than males. 
They concluded that "sex discrimination 
against women in the legal profession is a 
charge sustained by little tangible but much 
intangible evidence" (Laband 1993, p. 253). 
Laband's and Lentz's results offer empirical 
support for the predictions of Bergmann's 
overcrowding theory--wage differentials do 
not exist on a same-job basis, but females and 
males do appear to have different roles within 
the legal community. Additionally, the 
"intangible margins" may possibly be explained 
by statistical discrimination. Perhaps feedback 
effects are responsible for detennining family 
status as well as type ofpractice. 
They also tried to detennine whether or 
not female attorneys either self-selected 
(feedback effects) or were channeled into 
certain areas ofpractice (Laband, 248). Using 
a multivariate approach, Laband and Lentz ran 
"regression models ofthe detenninants oftime 
allocations to 16 subfields of law (Laband, 
248)." Forty-three explanatory variables were 
identified, and the regression was run on 1984 
data for 427 associate lawyers. Their results 
found "virtually no evidence of gender-based 
differences with respect to the self-reported 
percent of time respondents spent on various 
types of law (248)". Even though their results 
were not significant, it is interesting to note 
that for certain areas, the female coefficient 
was negative. These areas include: antitrust, 
labor/employment, natural resources, 
patent/trademark/copyright, public utility and 
tortslinsurance law. 
IV. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES: 
This study uses Dr. Bergmann's 
overcrowding hypothesis as a theoretical 
framework with which to extend the work of 
Laband and Lentz. Bergmann's theory 
suggests the following hypotheses: 
1) crowding in the legal labor market leads to 
wage differentials between male and female 
lawyers; 
2) separate labor markets for male and female 
lawyers exist in the form ofjob segregation by 
type oflaw practiced (area ofconcentration); 
3) male and female lawyers are segregated 
with respect to position within the firm. 
These hypotheses will be tested using 
descriptive statistics, cross-tab analysis as well 
as OLS and LOGIT regression analysis. While 
two sets of data will be used to test the 
hypotheses, both data sources will incorporate 
some of the variables included in the Laband 
and Lentz research. 
Does crowding exist? 
A. WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
1. Model 
One of the indirect implications of 
Bergmann's model is that wage differentials 
develop between the discriminated against 
(female) and the preferred (male) segments of 
a specific labor market (legal labor market). A·· 
sample of 45 legal professionals (21 females 
and 24 males), obtained from the National 
Longitudinal Survey ofYouth (NLSy), will be 
used to test this hypothesis. The NLSY 
database contains information on 12,686 
individuals; this data was collected by·means 
of annual personal interviews conducted by 
U.s. Census personnel between the years of' 
1979 and 1990 (Center for Human Resources, 
1992). Due to the time period covered by the 
NLSY, this sample consists ofrelatively young 
lawyers. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis will be used to test for statistically 
significant differences in annual wage income 
between male and female lawyers. As implied 
by Bergmann's theory, it is expected that being 
female has a negative effect on the amount of 
an individual's wages/salary because women 
are "crowded" into lower paying jobs. A 
dummy variable for gender (1=female; 
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O=male) is predicted to have a significant and 
negative coefficient. In order to better explain 
differences in wages/salary, I will try to control 
for work experience using proxy variables--the 
number of hours worked during the 1991 
calendar year (HOURS) and age (AGE). As 
the number of hours worked (age) increases, 
so should the wages/salary. Positive and 
significant signs are expected. 
Furthermore, the NLSY divides marital 
status into three groups: never married, 
married with spouse present, and other. For 
the purposes ofthis study, the variables will be 
recoded into a dummy variable: MARRIED 
equals 1 if the respondent is married with 
hislher spouse present, and 0 if otherwise. 
Human capital theory indicates that marriage 
can impact the number of hours an individual 
devotes to the workplace. It may increase the 
number of hours worked as the individual 
substitutes leisure time for an increase in 
income. This may occur ifthe individual is the 
principal wage earner for a family. On the 
other hand, marriage may result in a decrease 
in hours worked as the individual substitutes 
away from work and towards time spent in 
non-labor market activities. In this case, the 
individual values time spent out of the labor 
market more than he/she values participation 
in the professional workplace. This study will 
use the marriage dummy variable as a control 
variable. Comparisons will be made with the 
results ofLaband and Lentz. 
2. Results 
OLS regression results are listed in Table 1 
(see next page). Model A includes all ofthe 
variables: hours worked, gender, marital 
status, and age. Model B does not control for 
marital status. And, Model C is a simple 
regression with age and gender for 
independent variables. In all three models, the 
dependent variable is the amount of the 
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respondent's annual wages/salary for the 1991 
calendar year. 
Unequal access to 
opportunity, rather than 
unequal returns, constitutes 
the principal source ofmale­
female differences in 
employment outcomes. 
Unlike the results ofLaband and Lentz, all 
three· models have a significantly negative 
coefficient for the -.female gender variable 
(FEMALE). This supports the hypothesis 
implied in Bergmann's theory: crowding in the 
legal labor market does lead to wage 
differentials between males and females. 
Specifically, in Model C being female reduces 
a lawyers annual wages/salary by 516,539.18, 
ceteris paribus (See Table 2). What's more, 
AGE is the most significant ofthe proxies for 
experience-in Model C, one additional year of 
experience brings about. an increase of 
54603.42 in the individual's annual 
wages/salary. HOURS worked and marital 
status (MARRIED) do not have significant 
effects on an individuals earnings. 
. The insignificance of the marital status 
variable is noteworthy because of its 
relationship with the results of Laband and 
Lentz's research. In order to approach the 
problem in a manner closer to that used by 
Laband and Lentz, who included family status 
variables [number of children and marital 
status] (237), an interaction variable was 
created between gender and marital status 
(FEMMARRY). Even though Laband and 
Lentz found no significant difference between 
gender and family status, a recent sUlVey 
Four 
Table 1: OLS regression: Dependent variable--Annual wages/salary (1991). 
T-statistics are given in parentheses. 
Significance: *=.10 **=.05 ***=.01 
Independent 
Variable: Model A ModelB Model C 
FEMALE -17129.87 -17605.91 -16539.18 
(-1.729 *) (-1.802 *) (-1.720 *) 
AGE 4478.46 4210.44 4603.42 
(1.938 *) (1.878 *) ( 2.119 **) 
HOURS 4.71 6.17 
( .566 ) (.801 ) 
MARRIED 5935.52 
(.590 ) 
constant -91103.52 -83216.07 -81856.67 
adj R2 .128 .147 .157 
Model F-stat 2.25 * 2.95 ** 4.17 ** 
n 34 34 34 
conducted by The National Law Journal found including variables for different areas of 
that, "...more than six out of 10 women, concentration, firm size and urban/rural 
compared with just two in 10 men, said that locations. These may also play a part through 
their careers have suffered in relation to their supply and demand as well as cost of living 
colleagues whose 'significant others' do not mechanisms. 
work full time....--if only because, as the 
respondents agree, women have primary How is crowding manifested? 
responsibility for the children" (1993). This 
study agreed with The National Law Journal, Data from the Martindale-Hubbell Law 
and as is consistent with the previous DirectOI}' (1992), a"state-by-state compilation 
discussion of labor market participation, of professional biographies for lawyers in 
expected that being female and married has a private practice, was coded to create variables 
negative effect on wages/salary. This was not that represent areas ofconcentration, position 
the case; when FEMMARRY was included with current employer, firm size, geographic 
in regression analysis, it was not significant. It location, and educational background. 
seems that marriage does not significantly hundred lawyers, two hundred females (an 
affect wages/salary. On the other hand, it may over-representation), and two hundred males, 
be that the young ages of the NLSY were· randomly selected from all fifty states. 
respondents biases these results. The exclusion ofin-house corporate attorneys 
Future research may shed some additional and those employed by the goyernment is 
light on the detennination ofwagesisalaries by likely to bias my results, particularly because 
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Table 2: 
ESTIMATED SALARIES
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female lawyers are expected to be 
disproportionately represented in these sectors 
(ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 19). Even so, this data 
makes it easier to compare my results to those 
of Laband and Lentz. It is possible that the 
MDH data will provide more reliable results 
because the sample is representative of the 
national population of lawyers. 
-
A: OCCUPATIONAL CROWDING 
1. Model 
Descriptive statistics and cross-tabs will be 
used to examine the distribution oflawyers in 
certain areas ofpractice. Firm size will also be 
examined because certain types of law may be 
more likely to be practiced in large firms. 
Also, a greater proportion of female lawyers 
are expected to work in small firms or solo 
practices--this seems to have been the general 
trend, with female lawyers reporting greater 
responsibility and a greater chance of 
partnership in such firms (Deakin,' 1993). 
Proof for crowding will include significant 
gender differences among occupational 
distributions by specialty. Whereas the NLSY 
analysis will provide indirect evidence of 
possible crowding in the legal labor market, 
the MDH analysis will provide insight into the 
specific ways in which crowding may be 
manifested. 
Theory as well as personal accounts offered 
by the ROUNDTABLE participants predict 
that female lawyers concentrate their practices 
in the areas of general/family practice [GP­
FAM], corporate/finance law [CORP-FIN], 
estate/probate and tax law [EST-TAX] and 
criminal law [CRIM]. Societal stereotypes 
have long cast women in nurturing and 
caretaking roles--charaeteristics that are 
thought to be indicative offamily law (Epstein, 
102). Similar reasoning may explain the over-
representation of females in the practice of 
estate/probate and tax law (Epstein, 102). As 
was previously mentioned, female lawyers are 
expected to be disproportionately represented 
in corporate in-house legal operations 
(ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 19). Similarly, this 
study anticipates that females are also over­
represented in corporate/finance practice. 
Unlike the previous areas of concentration, 
criminal practice does not involve typically 
"female" topics. Instead, it has been 
hypothesized that female lawyers may have a 
significant presence in this area of practice 
because criminal law is viewed as the "lowest 
form of courtroom work" (Epstein, 1"06). 
Research by Laband and Lentz offers empirical 
support for these predictions; even though the 
coefficients were not statistically significant, ... ­
the above-mentioned areas of concentration 
were positively related to a female dummy 
variable (p. 249). 
On the other hand, fewer women are 
expected to spend a significant amount oftime 
working on cases in the following areas: 
litigation and appellate work [LIT-APPEl, 
labor/employment law [LABOR], 
environmental concerns [ENVIR] and 
copyrightlpatentfmtellectual property law 
[pATENT]. Presumably litigation and 
appellate work is viewed as an area of 
concentration requiring typically "male virtues" 
that result in a confident and aggressive 
courtroom presence (ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 
24). Clients and decision makers inside firms 
do not expect as good results from a female 
lawyer as they do from a male. Furthermore, 
female attorneys with these attributes may 
actually be looked down upon if they do 
exhibit such qualities: 
If they are tough in the courtroom, 
then they are not pleasant to work 
with as a partner. And if they are 
not tough in the courtroom, then they 
are a lovely person to work with, 
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but nobody would want to be 
represented by them in court 
(ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 26). 
As mentioned earlier, labor and 
employment law tends to be male-dominated 
because the leadership oflabor unions tends to 
be male-dominated. Recently, participation by 
female lawyers has been increasing, but only 
slowly (ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 28). As for the 
ENVIR and PATENT classifications, males 
may be more dominant in these areas of 
concentration because of the scientific 
component--science has long been a 
stereotypically "male" field of study. Laband 
and Lentz found negative coefficients for their 
female dummy variable when it was regressed 
against these four areas (p. 249). My study 
maintains these predictions. 
The areas of civil practice [CIVIL], 
malpractice law [MAL], personal injury and 
workers' compensation law [PI], international 
practice [INTL], and insurance defense 
practice [INSDEF] are uncertain. First, the 
area of civil practice is very broad. It also 
includes a mixture offunctions some-ofwhich 
.	 are traditionally thought of as "male" or 
"female". Second, the areas of malpractice, 
personal injury, and insurance defense are 
highly specialized areas of concentration­
lawyers may not report these specific areas as 
the focus of their practices. Furthermore, 
these areas often involve specialized medical 
and business components. As mentioned 
earlier, males are more traditionally found in 
areas dealing with medicine, and females are 
expected to be found in areas dealing with 
corporate/finance matters. It is hard to tell 
which subject area will dominate and even 
harder to tell whether or not lawyers of a 
particular gender will dominate these areas of 
practice. For these reasons no predictions are 
made. 
2. Results 
Generally, tests for "gender" crowding by 
area of concentration were consistent with 
those of previous research; there was no 
significant evidence of crowding. Individual 
cross-tabs were run between the FEMALE 
variable and each area of concentration. 
Results are reported in Table 3 (see next 
page). As forecast by theory and the Laband 
and Lentz research, the areas of corporate­
finance and general-family practice did contain 
a larger percentage of women. While the 
difference was not significant in the corporate­
finance area, it was significant at the .10 level 
for the area of general-family law. Criminal 
and estate-tax practices had been hypothesized· 
to be significantly female areas of 
concentration, but those areas were 
numerically dominated by males (70.6% male 
and 56.7% male, respectively). 
Ofthe areas that were hypothesized to be 
predominately male, only litigation-appellate 
law contained a larger percentage ofmen than 
women; the difference was not statistically 
significant. Contrary to prediction, the areas of 
environmental, labor and patent law had more 
women than men. Again, the differences were 
not statistically significant. Perhaps these 
differences are due to a combination of an 
increase in young female attorneys that have 
entered the job market recently and the 
increase in demand for lawyers in areas like 
environmental, labor and patent law 
(USN&WR, p. 110). 
Surprisingly, the area of concentration 
with the greatest significant difference between 
male and female lawyers was one that had no 
previous prediction--personal injury and 
workers' compensation [PI]. Reporting a 
composition of 72.4% males and 27.6% 
females, it was significant at the .05 level. 
Perhaps the medical content and often litigious 
nature ofthis type ofpractice has generally 
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Table 3: Cross-tabs. FEMALE and AREA(s) OF CONCENTRATION 
AREA OF EXPECTED Clll-
CONCENTRATION DOMINANCE % MALE % FEMALE SQUARE 
CIVIL (166) ? 50.0 50.0 .0000 
CORP-FIN (209) F 49.3 50.7 .0401 
CRIM ( 17) F 70.6 29.4 2.2116 
ENVIR ( 19) M 42.1 57.9 .2210 
EST-TAX ( 60) F 56.7 43.3 .9608 
GP-FAM ( 95) F 42.1 57.9 2.7058* 
INSDEF ( 13) ? 46.2 53.8 .0000 
INTL ( 15) ? 46.7 53.3 .0000 
LABOR ( 14) M 42.9 57.1 .0740 
LIT-APPE . (129) M 51.9 48.1 .1831 
MAL ( 8) ? 50.0 50.0 .0000 
PATENT ( 10) M 30.0 70.0 .9231 
.PI (29) ? 72.4 27.6 5.3537** 
-parentheses contain the number of sample lawyers indicating a concentration in the specified 
area; total number does not equal 800 because some lawyers only listed one area ofconcentration 
n =400 
* =significant at .10 level 
** = significant at .05 level 
discouraged women from entering, or has that is necessary to specialize in this area. 
otherwise kept them out of this area. Another Overall statistically significant support of 
possibility is that this type ofpractice requires the crowding hypothesis on the basis ofarea of 
a significant amount of experience, and the concentration is weak. Apparently male and 
majority of female lawyers have not been female lawyers are not significantly segregated 
practicing long enough to get the experience into different areas ofconcentration. However, 
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complications with the MDH data may have 
influenced the results. The subjective nature 
used to report an individual's areas of 
concentration poses two potential problems. 
First, in addition to being a reference source, 
the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory can 
also be used as an advertising device. As such, 
firms and individuals may try to maximize the 
probability of getting ~ew business by being 
very general in describing their practices. Or, 
finns and individuals wishing to increase their 
caseload in a particular area ofpractice may be 
very specific in describing their practices. 
Second, whether or not an individual declares 
a particular area of concentration depends in 
part on how he/she defines that particular 
specialty. For example, what one individual 
considers to be a civil practice may be 
considered by another to be a general-family 
practice. Perhaps these data complications 
have biased my results. 
Another possibility: certain areas of 
concentration are more likely to be practiced 
in large finns. Iffemale lawyers are, as Deakin 
(1993) suggests, more likely to practice in 
smaller finns, then they may also be less likely 
to specialize in these areas. To test for possible 
indirect effects of firm size on area of 
concentration, fum size variables were recoded 
to create BIGFIRM, a· dummy variable that 
indicated firms having 60 or more attorneys. 
Cross-tabs of BIGFIRM with each area of 
concentration and with FEMALE produced 
mixed results. Only three areas of 
concentration had significant differences 
between large and smalVmedium firms. Ofthe 
lawyers concentrating in the area of general­
family practice, 72.6% worked in small or 
medium firms and 27.4% worked in large 
firms, at the .05 level of significance. 
Considered together with the cross-tabs 
between FEMALE and general-family 
practice, this appears to be consistent with 
Deakin as well as Laband and Lentz. On the 
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other hand, the results for the female­
dominated area of international law do not 
uphold this hypothesis. 46.790A» ofthose with 
a concentration in international law were 
found to be in smalVmedium firms and 53.3% 
were in large firms; this was significant at the 
.01 level. Again, no concrete conclusions can 
be drawn. It may be that firm size plays a role 
in det~g partnership status (Deakin), but 
not in determining area(s) of concentration. 
This will be examined in the next section. 
B: PARTNERSHIP 
1. Model 
In addition to exanunmg areas, of 
concentration, the MDH data will be used'to 
examine a lawyers position within the firm. 
Division of labor within a law firm occurs 
between partner and associate levels. 
Generally, partnership status is determined 
after 7 1/2 to 9 1/2 years with a firm 
(ROUNDTABLE 1, p. 17); it has been 
determined that after ten year~, .S90A» ofmales 
and only 23% of females become partners 
(ROUNDTABLE 3, p. 15). If "gender" 
crowding is present, it is expected tha~ cross­
tabs and regression analysis will reveal a 
statistical significance on the basis ofgender. 
Specifically, a negative relationship is expected 
between partnership and a female dummy 
variable (l=female; O=male). 
Theoretically, the probability ofa lawyer 
achieving partnership status depends on human 
capital investment, experience and other 
criteria: 
PARTNER =f(HUMCAP, EXPERIENCE, 
OTHER) 
The actual variables to be used in this study 
are presented in Table 4 (see next page). 
Human capital influences include law school 
prestige [TOPQUART, 2ndQUART, 
3rdQUART], law school performance 
[HONORS], law review experience [REV], 
Table 4: Determinants ofPartnership 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
PARTNER Partnership status; (1 = partner; 0 = otherwise) 
FEMALE Gender identified as female; (1 = female; 0 = male) 
EXP Experience; 92-BAR, with BAR = year offirst admittance to bar
 
EXPSQ EXP *EXP
 
FS-l Firm consists of2-3 lawyers; (1 = finn size of2-3; 0 = otherwise)
 
FS-2 Firm consists of4-9 lawyers; (1 = firm size of4-9; 0 = otherwise)
 
F8-3 Firm consists of 10-20 lawyers; (1 = firm size of 10-20; 0 =otherwise)
 
FS-4 Firm consists of21-30 lawyers; (1 = firm size of21-30; 0 = otherwise)
 
FS-S Finn consists of31-60 lawyers; (1 =firm size of31-60; 0 = otherwise)
 
FS-6 Finn consists of61-90 lawyers; (1 =firm size of61-90; 0 =otherwise)
 
FS-7 Firm consists of90+ lawyers; (1 =firm size of90+; 0 =otherwise)
 
BIGFIRM Firm consists of60+ lawyers; (1=firm size of60+; 0 =otherwise)
 
TOPQUART Law school is ranked in top quartile; (1 =top; 0 = otherwise)
 
2ndQUART Law school is ranked in second quartile; (1 = second; 0 =otherwise)
 
3rdQUART Law school is ranked in third quartile; (1 =third; 0 =otherwise)
 
HONORS Graduated law school with honors; (1 = honors; 0 = otherwise)
 
REV Worked on law r~view during law school; (1 = review; 0 = otherwise)
 
CLERK Worked as law clerk during law school or the year following the completion
 
of law school; (1 =clerk; 0 = otherwise) 
WEST Practicing in Western geographic region; (1 =yes; 0 = otherwise) 
MIDWEST Practicing in Midwestern geographic region; (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) 
SOUTH Practicing in Southern geographic region; (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) 
NORTH Practicing in the Northern geographic region; (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) 
and clerkship experience [CLERK]. are included because oftheir voluntary nature; 
Experience is measured as the number ofyears the individual law student actively chooses to 
in practice [EXP]. To account for the participate in these activities as a way 
likelihood ofpartnership status increasing at a enhancing hislher future performance. This 
decreasing rate with respect to experience, additional general training is expected to be 
EXPSQ will also be included. Finally, gender positively related to partnership. 
[FEMALE], finn size [FS-l, FS-2, FS-3, FS­ This study uses law school prestige, as 
4, FS-S, FS-6, FS-7 and BIGFIRM], and determined by the U.S. News & World 
geographical location [WEST, MIDWEST, Report's quartile ranking of the nation's law 
NORTH, SOUTH] are included. schools. It is expected that going to a more 
Law review experience and any extra­ prestigious law school will enhance an 
curricular events that a lawyer participates in individual's chance of making partner. These 
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results will be compared to those of Laband 
and Lentz. Instead of using an established 
system for ranking law school, Laband and 
Lentz relied on the respondents' subjective 
opinions as to whether their law schools were 
"very prestigious", "somewhat prestigious", 
"not very prestigious" or "not prestigious" (p. 
256).. Thus, the results achieved using the law 
school ranking and ~H'data are expected to 
be more reliable. 
Clients and decision makers 
iriside firms do not expect as 
good of results from a female 
lawyer as they do from a 
male. 
Years in practice (EXP) are expected to 
be significantly and positively related to 
partnership status. HQwever, EXPSQ is 
expected to have negative and significant 
coefficient.· This would indicate that the 
positive effect of experience on partnership 
increases at a decreasing rate--as an individual 
spends more time with a firm in the capacity of 
a non-partner, the likelihood of becoming a 
. partner increases at a slower rate. Eventually 
a leveling offoccurs. 
The following variables have an effect on 
partnership: years with present employer 
(firm), full- or part-time employment, billable 
hours, ability to bring in business, on-the-job 
extras as well as sociological variables such as 
race, marital status, and number of children. 
The first two are direct quantitative measures 
of experience and are traditionally positively 
related to partnership. Likelihood of 
becoming a partner is positively related to full­
time employment, but negatively related to 
part-time status (Lewin, p. 15). 
Laband and Lentz suggest that firm size 
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can affect a lawyer's chance of becoming a 
partner. Their results indicate that a greater 
probability of partnership exists in smaller 
firms (p. 238), a finding that is consistent with 
current trends as identified by Deakin (1993). 
This study tests the same hypotheses. 
Geographic location may also influence 
partnership. As the National Law 10umal­
West Publishing ·Company survey results 
revealed, "[g]enerally, more women in Los 
Angeles and Washington said they felt their· 
firms provided equal opportunities than did 
women in Boston or Chicago (Lewin, p. 15)". 
Regional differences were also reported 
regarding the complications that female 
lawyers face because of male-only clubs 
(Lewin, p. 15). 
While this study was limited by data, the 
literature discusses other variables that might 
affect the likelihood ofbecoming a partner. In 
future research, it might be helpful to evaluate 
the effects that the following variables have on 
partnership: years with firm, full- or part-time 
employment, billable hours, ability to bring in 
business, as well as sociological variables such 
as race, marital status, and number ofkids. 
Since the ability to bring in business and 
billable hours are often used as important 
measures of productivity, they are also taken 
into account as a firm's management is making 
decisions regarding partnership. A positive 
relationship would be predicted. Race, marital 
status, and number of children may affect an 
individual's probability ofbeing partner. Race 
would be expected to have a negative effect if 
the individual is a minority. Furthermore, 
marital status and number of children may 
indirectly affect an individual's tastes 
for/against hours spent in the workplace (See 
the discussion of work-force participation). 
Interaction variables between these variables 
and gender might also produce interesting 
results with respect to predicting partnership 
status. 
of 
These include sets of 
2. Results 
To begin assessing the relationship between 
gender and status within the firm, I eliminated 
solo practitioners because they have no 
opportunity for further advancement. In o~der 
to accurately account for the fact that 
partnership is generally granted between 7 ~ 
and 9 ~ years (ROUNDTABLE 1, ..p. 17), and 
to eliminate outliers that were detected by the 
cross-tabs analysis, I decided to further restrict 
the sample to those lawyers with between 6 
and 20 years of experience. This reduces the 
sample size to 226 (99 males and 127 
females). Only results obtained using the 
restricted sample will be reported here. 
ai-variate cross-tab analysis between 
FEMALE and PARTNER did reveal a 
significant relationship. Referring to Table 5 
(see next page), 74.7% ofthe male lawyers are 
partners, compared to 57.7% of the female 
lawyers. The difference is significant at the .01 
level. 
In hopes of better understanding the 
magnitude .of the relationship, I switched to 
multi-variate regression analysis. LOGIT 
analysis was chosen because of the 
dichotomous dependent . variable 
(PARTNER). Unlike OLS regression analysis, 
.the LOGIT coefficients cannot be treated like 
probability values. However, the signs and 
significance ofthe coefficients can be analyzed 
in much the same way as they are in OLS. 
LOGIT results are presented in Table 6. 
Model A, the complete mode~ includes all 
of the variables that are expected to effect 
partnership status. In Model B, the firm size 
variables are recoded into the dummy variable 
BIGFIRM; only the law school variable of 
TOPQUART remains; variables indicating an 
individual's geographic location are eliminated; 
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and the human capital variables ofHONORS, 
REV and CLERK are removed. Model C 
evaluates the effects of gender (FEMALE), 
experience (EXP and EXPSQ) and law school 
rank (TOPQUART) on partnership. These 
Generally, more women in 
Los Angeles and 
Washington said they felt 
their law firms provided 
equal opportunities than did 
women in Boston or 
Chicago. 
changes and individual results will be discussed 
later. 
In general these results support the 
crowding hypothesis-male and female lawyers 
are segregated with respect to position within 
the firm, ceteris paribus. FEMALE has the 
expected negative sign, and it is a statistically 
significant predictor ofpartnership status. This 
relationship is maintained even after 
controlling for geographical location, firm size, 
experience and human capital influences. 
As is consistent with human capital theory and 
the findings ofLaband and Lentz, both EXP 
and EXPSQ are extremely significant. 
Model A also reveals that law school, 
geographic region and other human capital 
measures (HONORS, REV and CLERK) do 
not significantly affect the prediction 
. partnership status. In order to conselVe 
degrees of freedom, Model B drops several 
insignificant variables. 
dummy variables for finn size, human capital 
investment and geographic location. Before 
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Table 5: 
PARTNERSHIP STATUS BY GENDER
 
(restricted sample)
 
I­
Z 
W 
o
 
tr 
w 
a. 
100 
60 
40 
20 
67 
II MALE II FEMALE 
they were dropped, the groups of variables 
were tested to see it: as groups, they 
significantly affected the prediction power of 
the equation. The significance ofthe changes 
in chi-square and the degrees offreedom were 
evaluated. No statistically significant 
differences were found. 
The relative insignificance of the human 
capital variables leads me to believe that once _ 
a lawyer'is hired, he/she is viewed as an equal 
among hislher peers. Although general 
training may be responsible for getting the job, 
there is no evidence in these results that the 
general training helps a lawyer achieve 
partnership. Perhaps firm-specific training is 
more important. This finding would offer 
support for the results of the National Law 
Journal-West Publishing Company survey and 
the BlaulFerber research. Unfortunately, there 
is no way for me to directly test this 
hypothesis. 
Of the three dummy variables which 
capture the quality of law school, only 
TOPQUART was retained in Model B. This 
was done to maintain the theoretical integrity 
ofthe model. Furthermore, it is possible that 
the ranked "quality" ofthe law school affects 
future performance more than the individual's 
performance in law school. TOPQUART is 
significant at the .05 level in Model B and the 
.01 level in Model C. 
With the exception of FS-6, none of the 
firm size variables are significant. This is 
consistent with preliminary cross-tab analysis 
ofpartner and firm size, controlling for gender. 
Since firm size was implicated as an important 
determinant of partnership by Laband and 
Lentz as well as Deakin, and because FS-6 
was significant at the .10 level, a dummy 
variable (BIGFIRM) that indicates firms with 
60 or more attorneys was added to the 
equation. Unlike the previous predictions, 
BIGFIRM is not statistically significant. 
So, what do the LOGIT results reveal 
about "gender" crowding by position within 
the law firm? One' way to answer this question 
more definitively is to see the LOGIT 
cumulative distribution function and the 
estimated LOGIT coefficients to test the 
accuracy ofprediction for Model C. For each 
of the 226 lawyers, an estimated probability 
was calculated. A probability of more than 
(less than) .50 is a prediction of being a 
partner (non-partner). Accordingly, Model C 
has an error rate of27%, with 44 Type I errors 
and 17 Type IT errors. . 
In order to make specific estimates 
regarding the probability of being a partner, 
the independent variables must be assigned 
definite values~ For example, assume that the 
respondent has 10 years ofexperience (EXP = 
10 and EXPSQ = 100) and went to a top 
quartile law school (TOPQUART = 1). 
Using the logistic cumulative distribution 
function, it is estimated1hat a male lawyer has 
a 63. 1% probability of being a partner; .a 
female with -the same qualifications has an 
estimated probability of 48.7%. Model C 
predicts that the male is a partner, while the 
female is not. Being'female apparently.reduces 
a lawyer's chances' ofbeing a partner by 14.4 
percentage points, ceteris paribus. When 
other assumptions are made regarding the 
values of the independent variables, the 
computed gender differences are similar. The 
effect is generally around 12 percentage 
points. As Bergmann's crowding hypothesis 
suggests, male and female lawyers are 
segregated according to position within the 
firm. 
On an interesting side note, the control 
variable for law school prestige, 
TOPQUART, has a highly significant impact_ 
on the probability of becoming a partner for 
both males and females. Using the same 
assumptions from above, a male (female) who 
had not gone to a top quartile law school 
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would have an estimated probability of43.5% 
(30.0%). The probability of being a partner 
decreases by nearly 20 percentage points! 
While this study was not able to identify 
the interaction effects between gender and law 
school prestige, cross-tab analysis of the law 
school variables with FEMALE indicated that 
males were significantly more likely to 
graduate from a law school in the top quartile 
(X2 = 3.646**). On the other hand, females 
were more likely to graduate from a law 
school in the third quartile (X2 = 6.396***). 
These results are similar to those of Laband 
and Lentz, who found more males in the top 
halt: and more females in the bottom half (p. 
256). 
The relative insignificance 
of the human capital 
variables leads me to believe 
that once a lawyer is hired, 
he/she.is viewed as an equal 
among-his/her peers. ­
I can think oftwo instances in which such 
law school segregation, might occur. First, 
gender discrimination on the part ofadmission 
committees at law schools may give male 
students an advantage. This would be an 
example of the direct effects of statistical 
discrimination (imperfect information). Or, 
self-segregation and feedback effects may lead 
women to enroll in less prestigious schools. 
Conditions that might influence feedback 
effects include parental and societal pressures 
as well as the knowledge that, until recently, 
many of the prestigious law schools were 
actively opposed to enrolling female students 
(Epstein, p. 50). Fearing disapproval, lack of 
financial support or considerable 
discrimination, females may choose to enroll in 
less prestigious schools. As manifestations of .' 
statistical discrimination, these feedback 
effects reinforce the stereotype that female law 
students are not as smart or as tough as their 
male counterparts (Epstein, 1981). 
Thus, the cross-tab analysis and 
TOPQUARTs significance indicate that self­
segregation into a less prestigious law school, 
as a result of feedback effects, may adversely 
affect the female lawyer's quest for 
partnership. This is not direct, but indirect in 
that it gives the male who graduated froin a 
prestigious school an advantage. 
Attitudes-origins of crowding? 
1. Model 
In an attempt to uncover the origins of 
crowding--what causes the negative sign on 
the FEMALE variable in the preceding 
analyses--a set of attitudinal responses from 
the NLSY was evaluated. Eleven questions 
were asked about control, self-esteem, and 
family attitudes. It is expected that male 
respondents are more likely than their female 
counterparts to feel a sense of control ·over 
their actions and the directions that their lives 
are taking (attitudes of control and self~ 
esteem). Also, it is expected that males ar~ 
more likely to favor traditional roles for 
females within the family unit (family 
attitudes). However, it is not clear if this 
difference will be statistically significant. 
Uncertainty arises because the sample is small 
and because the sample is composed ofyoung 
attomeys--a group that has, in general, been 
exposed to greater gender equality in both the 
home and educational environment. 
Therefore, it is not immediately apparent what 
significance the differences will have on the 
regression results. 
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2. Results 
Overall males and females did not differ 
significantly with respect to attitudes of 
control. As a group, the young lawyers felt • 
that they were in control of their plans from 
beginning to end. However, the results on 
self-esteem statements were mixed. 
Surprisingly, 100% of the females responded 
that they disagree/strongly disagree with the 
following statements: 1) "I feel that I am a 
person ofworth, at least on an equal basis with 
others", and 2) "I am able to do things ~ well 
as most other people". Cross-tab analysis 
found that these differences, with respect to 
gender, were significant withj2 = 2.81*. 
This implies that feedback effects may 
indirectly play a strong role in the decisions of 
these young female lawyers. The societal 
forces that shape these females' sense of self­
esteem may direct choices regarding law 
schooL area ofconcentration, firm size as well 
as many other career-related decisions. 
On the other hand, cross-tab analysis of 
family attitudes and gender provide different 
conclusions. The following statements had a 
significant number ofmales agreeing/strongly 
agreeing with them: 1) "A woman's place is 
in the home, not in the office or shop", and 2) 
"A wife who carries out her full family 
responsibilities doesn't have time for outside 
employment". The differences were 
significant withj2 = 2.81 * andj2 = 
6.06***, respectively. While the presence of 
a statistically significant difference is 
somewhat discouraging, a closer examination 
is needed. For both statements 100% of the 
females disagreed/strongly disagreed; 87.5% 
(75.0%) of the male respondents disagreed 
/strongly disagreed with statement 1. This 
leaves only 12.5% (25.0%) ofthe males who 
agreed/strongly agreed with the statements. 
The relatively low percentages of males 
agreeing with these statements is encouraging. 
Unfortunately, complications arise if the 
attitudes of th~ 12.5% of males from 
statement 1 and the 25.0% of males from 
statement 2 are shared by those lawyers who 
are- in management positions. This would 
mean that management decisions, including 
those regarding job assignment and partnership 
status, might be subconsciously biased against 
females. 
Due to the small and age-restricted nature 
ofthe NLSY data, further generalizations and 
speculations could result in biased conclusions. 
It would be very interesting to see how a 
larger and more age-diverse sample of lawyers 
respond to these statements. Perhaps this is an 
area for future research. 
v. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
While the analysis of wages/salaries and 
partnership status shows significant support 
for Bergmann's overcrowding hypothesis, 
more can be done in an attempt to clarify and 
strengthen the results. Perhaps the most 
important area for future research would be 
that of determining the exact roles that 
feedback effects and statistical discrimination 
(imperfect information) play in the origination 
of crowding. While it is important to realize 
that some attitudes and variables which may 
be either directly or indirectly related to gender 
cannot be measured in a tangible manner, the 
NLSY attitude questions provide a starting 
point from which to develop a more in-depth 
analysis. Future research could focus on the 
attitude analysis of lawyers and law students, 
using statements similar to those found in the 
NLSY. By analyzing these attitudes, it might 
be possible to pinpoint the causes ofcrowding. 
Once the magnitudes of these effects are 
isolated, problem areas can be addressed. 
Based on the results of this study, a two 
step program may be suggested. The first step 
would involve combating low female self­
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esteem; and the second would involve 
confronting stereotypes concerning the 
"proper" roles of females ~n the professional 
and domestic worlds. As Howlett suggests, • 
"Our profession [law] is really a reflection of 
what is happening in the rest of society" 
(ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 28). Until the 
stereotypes and misperceptions are eliminated, 
Bergmann's model of labor market 
overcrowding may continue to be supported 
by much "intangible" evidence, but little 
measurable evidence. 
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